Infrastructure Australia releases its evaluation of Sydney–Newcastle HSR

By Garry Glazebrook

The High Speed Rail Authority (HSRA) has probably gotten high-speed rail closer to reality than ever before. It remains to be seen whether the Government will be brave enough to proceed to the next steps, and if so, how the project will evolve from there.

With no fanfare it was revealed recently that Infrastructure Australia’s (IA) evaluation of the Business Case for the first stage of HSR (between Sydney and Newcastle) has been released and forwarded to the Government. Oddly there was no press release from IA or from Minister Catherine King’s office. However, it was picked up by the Sydney Morning Herald, the ABC and the Guardian.

HSRA's proposed Sydney-Newcastle route

Positives and Negatives

On the positive side, the evaluation found that the project met the three conditions of strategic fit, societal benefits, and deliverability.  IA acknowledged the extensive work which HSRA had undertaken especially given the tight timetables it was given (approximately a year) to undertake the Business Case and associated “Product Definition Report”, which identified the broad parameters for the whole corridor from Melbourne to Brisbane.

However, on the negative side, IA’s evaluation suggested that:

• The benefit-cost ratio was likely to be low, potentially below 1 depending on the final assessment of benefits and costs

• More evidence of why Sydney – Newcastle had been selected as the first stage was needed (the 2013 Study had suggested Sydney – Canberra as the first stage)

• §  Most of the benefits are expected from the project’s contribution to housing, although some of these were questioned. The transport benefits were only 19% of the total benefits, with travel time benefits only 6% of the total benefit, which was considered low, and the first stage would only lead to 5% of motorists switching to high-speed rail.

• The emissions benefits were unclear given the likely high embodied emissions in Stage 1, which involves 60% tunnelling.

The evaluation was dated July 2025, some 7 months after the business case was received by IA, suggesting a lengthy evaluation and a significant further delay before it was released.

Next Steps

The next step is for the Government to consider moving to the “Development Phase”, expected to take a further two years and $600m. This will focus on confirming the alignment, station locations and costings for the first stage, as well as more detailed investigation of the entire route from Melbourne to Brisbane.

The decision on this next step is expected in the next few weeks, and likely before Christmas 2025. Assuming the project moves to the Development Phase, a final investment decision is therefore expected by late 2027.

Details of the First Stage (Sydney – Newcastle)

While the Business Case for Sydney – Newcastle is still confidential, IA’s evaluation has confirmed some of the assumptions HSRA has adopted, specifically:

• The high-speed line will be dedicated rather than integrated with the existing railway. Thus, high-speed trains will not be able to run on existing tracks, while existing trains will not be able to use the high-speed line.

• The first stage is broken into three sub-stages (see map):

  • Newcastle – Central Coast (Stage 1a)

  • Central Coast to Sydney Central (Stage 1b)

  • Central – Second Sydney Airport via Parramatta (Stage 1c)

The maximum speed in tunnelled sections will be 200 km/hr, but up to 320 km/hr on surface or elevated sections.

• A total of six stations are proposed for the whole of Stage 1:

  • Broadmeadow in Newcastle

  • Somewhere in Lake Macquarie Shire

  • Gosford

  • Central

  • Parramatta

  • Second Sydney Airport

• This stage will provide approximately 60,000 seats capacity per day, although details of this are scant.

• Some 60% of the overall first stage is assumed to be in tunnel.

• Timings are expected to see Stage 1a completed by 2037 assuming construction starts in 2027/28, stage 1b by 2039, and Stage 1c by 2042.

Some further details of the Business Case can be inferred, though they are subject to some uncertainty:

• To date there has been little or no consideration of the use of value capture to help fund the project

• So far there has been no detailed examination of further extensions, either north from Broadmeadow or south from Second Sydney Airport

• While HSRA favours a route through Sydney including Central, Parramatta and Second Sydney Airport as it would provide more benefits, it also involves significantly more costs due to the additional tunnelling, with the result that the overall BCR is left unchanged.

• The route north from Sydney is likely to involve a continuous tunnel from Central to north of Gosford Station, including under the Hawkesbury River, with further tunnels in the Hunter to access Broadmeadow.

• The proposed stabling / maintenance facility is likely to be in the Central Coast so as to be on the surface.

Implications

As discussed in previous Fastrack Australia reports, the staging, route and approach adopted by HSRA has major implications:

• Sydney – Newcastle was always going to be the most difficult and expensive part of the overall East Coast HSR. Choosing this as the first stage is a high-stakes gamble. If the Government does proceed to commence there, subsequent stages should be significantly easier.

• However, the low BCR threatens the overall project being accepted.

• The approach of a dedicated line and the specific alignment and station locations further adds to cost, both from the amount of tunnelling and from the expensive underground stations (Gosford, Central, Parramatta and SSA).

• Unless the Government proceeds with multiple stages concurrently, it is difficult to see how the whole corridor from Melbourne to Brisbane could be completed by 2060.